Appropriately constructed measures of the quality of life and the quality of the business environment should be important determinants of the growth and composition of population across urban areas. This paper examines that question by extending theoretical measures of household quality of life to construct the first ever measure of the quality of the business environment -the value that firms place on the basket of amenities in a metropolitan area. An annual panel of quality of life and quality of business environment values for 37 cities in the United States is then constructed for the 1977 to 1995 period.
Introduction
In October 1999, Money Magazine rated San Francisco as the best city in which to live in the United States. A few years earlier, Places Rated Almanac gave that distinction to Pittsburgh, a city once known for its aging steel industry and poor air quality. Analogous rankings have also been published on the best places to do business. In May 2000, Forbes ranked Austin, Texas as the city with the best business environment in the United States, while Syracuse, New York was ranked far behind, at 172. Do these rankings suggest that households and firms favor different cities? If so, what are the implications for the growth and character of individual metropolitan areas? Moreover, given the ad hoc nature of popular rankings of urban areas, to what extent can economic theory be used to develop more reliable and more easily interpretable city rankings?
Cities develop because households and firms want to live and do business in those places. In that regard, one would expect city size and growth to increase with the value that households and firms place on a city's amenities. This suggests that appropriately constructed measures of the quality of life and the quality of the business environment should be important determinants of the distribution and composition of population across urban areas. This paper seeks to examine these issues by drawing on two seemingly disparate literatures that are in fact closely linked, the literature on urban quality of life and the literature on the migration decisions of retirees. As will become apparent, in addressing the impact of quality of life and quality of the business environment on metropolitan area growth and character, we also make several important methodological contributions to these literatures as well.
With the aging of the baby boomers, the growth and demographic composition of different cities is becoming increasingly sensitive to the locational preferences of retirees.
1 That view is implicit in many recent state and local initiatives to attract retiree populations. A number of states, for example, have seek out high quality-of-life and low cost-of-living areas. That idea, while compelling, has gone largely untested. In the case of the retirement literature, this may reflect that the theory offered by Graves and Knapp (1988) requires that one take into account the locational preferences of firms, a seemingly unnecessary complication considering the non-working status of retirees. The quality of life literature, on the other hand, is based on an open city model in which the migration of workers and firms drive house rents, wages, and the spatial distribution of employment across cities [e.g. Roback (1982) , Blomquist et al (1988) , and Gyourko and Tracy (1991) ]. That literature, however, has never measured firm valuations of urban amenities, focusing instead on household rankings of urban quality of life.
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Building off Graves and Knapp (1988) , this paper emphasizes that both households and firms are consumers of city-specific amenities. However, because households and firms differ in their objectivesutility maximization versus profit maximization -they likely differ as well in their valuation of a given basket of metropolitan area attributes (denoted Q H for households and Q F for firms). Moreover, changes in Q F shift the labor demand curve in a city while changes in Q H shift the labor supply curve. Together, Q F and Q H are shown to determine land rents and wages for individual metropolitan areas, while simultaneously driving the equilibrium distribution of workers across cities, and the spatial distribution of retirees. Thus, the degree to which firms want to locate in a city has important implications for the location decisions of both workers and retirees. In the case of workers, this occurs because workers and firms must locate together. In the case of retirees, this occurs because workers, firms, and retirees compete for space.
To extend our approach to the data, two important limitations of the existing literature on quality of life must be addressed. First and most important, we construct and estimate a measure for Q F that is 5 A rapidly growing empirical literature on agglomeration economies has also made abundantly clear the degree to which different patterns of employment agglomeration affect productivity and growth (Glaeser et al. (1992) , Ellison and Glaeser (1997) , Henderson et al. (1995) , Henderson and Black (1999) , Rosenthal and Strange (2000) ). That literature, however, largely does not address the influence of quality of life on the city-specific supply of labor.
solidly grounded in economic theory. To our knowledge, this is the first time that such a measure has been developed. This allows us to rank cities on the basis of firm amenity preferences, and ultimately, to evaluate whether firms and households favor similar or different metropolitan areas.
Second, the urban quality of life literature has been static in nature, precluding analysis of the impact of changes in city valuations on the growth and composition of urban areas. 6 In this paper, we draw on 19 years of data from the American Housing Survey (AHS) and Consumer Population Survey (CPS). Applying panel data methods to these data, we are able to greatly simplify construction of Q H and Q F relative to prior studies. This allows us to construct the first ever panel of Q H and Q F values for 37 U.S.
cities. The panel covers the 1977 to 1995 period on an annual basis and enables us to examine the dynamics of worker and retiree population changes across cities in response to changes over time in the quality of life and the quality of the business environment. A striking result from our analysis is that many of the cities least attractive to households are attractive to firms. Detroit, Gary, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C, for example, are all ranked in the bottom quartile in the eyes of households but are all ranked in the upper half by firms. 8 Those differences reflect the very different goals of the two groupsutility maximization versus profit maximization.
A second important set of results concerns tests of the model. Prior studies have emphasized that individual amenities could have opposite or similar appeal to workers and firms, and therefore, ambiguous effects on the equilibrium distribution of population among cities. That emphasis has largely precluded testing of the model [e.g. Blomquist et al (1988) ]. In contrast, by analyzing the time series relationship 6 A recent exception of sorts is Kahn (1995) . However, Kahn (1995) examined quality of life differentials for only four cities in the United States and for just two time periods, 1980 and 1990. 7 In contrast, Blomquist et al (1988) and Gyouko and Tracy (1991) both use the 1980 Decenial Census in their quality of life studies. Relative to the Census, the AHS has much superior information on housing attributes while the CPS has much superior information on characteristics of workers.
between population shares across cities, quality of the business environment, and quality of life, we are able to test several fundamental predictions of the model.
Most important, we find that improvements in the quality of life (Q H ) and in the quality of the business environment (Q F ) have strong positive effects on urban growth as measured by equilibrium city shares of workers. This suggests that firms and workers seek out cities with attractive amenities, ceteris paribus, a central assumption upon which the quality of life literature is based. In sharp contrast, we also find that a city's share of the total population of retirees falls as the city becomes more attractive to workers and firms. In addition, the city's ratio of retirees to workers increases with Q H but declines with an increase in the cost of housing. These results suggest that retirees shy away from cities that appeal to firms and workers in order to avoid the higher land rents that result from increased competition for space, consistent with the theoretical arguments of Graves and Knapp (1988) noted above. An intriguing policy implication follows: government policies designed to attract workers and firms -such as tax breaks offered to industry -may have the unintended effect of repelling retirees.
A final insight concerns the number of years that must elapse before the distribution of retirees and workers across cities adjusts to policy shifts or to other unexpected events that create migratory pressures.
Following an unexpected event that creates pressure for net migration, we find that roughly 90 percent of the adjustment of worker-population shares across cities occurs in 8-1/2 years, while retiree-population shares adjust in 6 years. The longer response time of worker populations likely arises because net migration of workers requires coordinated movement of human and physical industry-specific capital, raising the cost of worker migration. Because such costs are largely not relevant for retirees, the distribution of retirees across cities adjusts to unexpected events more quickly.
To clarify these and other results, the following section presents the theory that underlies our measures of Q H and Q F . Section 3 describes the data while Section 4 describes the Q H and Q F estimates.
Section 5 presents an error correction model (ECM) used for the time series analysis, and Section 6 presents results from the ECM. Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
Quality of Life and Quality of the Business Environment

Theory: Workers and Firms
We adopt an open city model and focus initially on workers and firms, both of who are assumed to be mobile. In addition, we assume that all lots are identical, all workers are equally skilled, and all workers inelastically supply one unit of labor. A spatial equilibrium across cities requires that worker utility (u) and firm profit (π) both be equal across metropolitan areas (j = 1, …, J) as given by
In (2.1) and (2.2), w j is the wage in city j relative to a given reference city, the wage for which is normalized to 1. Similarly, r j is the land rent in city j relative to the reference city, the land rent for which is also normalized to 1. The vector of amenities in city j is given by A j , while u and π are the equilibrium levels of utility and profit in the system. A third equilibrium condition requires that city population levels (P j ) sum to total population, P ,
Expressions (2.1) and (2.2) can be solved for the equilibrium wages and land rents in each city as shown in Figure 1 (see also Blomquist et al (1987) and Gyourko and Tracy (1991) ). Holding A j constant in city j, the iso-utility curve, j u , traces out the set of wages and land rents that satisfy (2.1) for city j: this function is upward sloping because higher w j must be offset by higher r j . Similarly, the iso-profit curve in city j, j π , traces out the set of w and r that satisfy (2.2): this function is downward sloping because higher w must be offset by lower r j . The intersection of j u and j π yields w j * and r j * for all j, … J, the equilibrium wages and land rents in each city, while simultaneously ensuring that (2.3) is satisfied.
Next, totally differentiate the indirect utility function along an indifference curve as in Roback (1982) to get
Rearranging and applying Roy's Identity yields
where L* is the optimum land use per household, while
is the marginal rate of substitution between A and w, or equivalently, the amount of income a household is willing to give up in exchange for a unit increase in A (with inelastic labor supply). Define
to simplify notation and normalize L* to 1.
Then the vector of marginal benefits that households derive from
where r H is the rent on a normalized unit of land per household. Equation (2.4) is the same expression as in Roback (1982 Roback ( , 1988 , Blomquist et al. (1988) , and Gyourko and Tracy (1991) .
Recall now that r j and w j vary across cities only because of differences in amenities. In addition, r j and w j are defined relative to a reference city, the land rent and wage rate for which are both normalized to 1. Then pre-multiplying both sides of (2.4) by A j , the benefit that households derive from amenities in city j relative to the reference city can be written as
(2.5)
Observe that (2.5) describes the amount of real wage families would be willing to give up to live in city j, where the real wage decreases with r H and increases with w. This measure is referred to as the urban "quality of life" in the literature.
A city's amenities affect not only household welfare, but also the cost of doing business. For example, firms trading with Canada will favor northern locations while those trading with Asia will favor west-coast locations, ceteris paribus. Similarly, proximity to natural resources, city size, and fiscal policies and services all influence the cost of producing and marketing products.
The value firms place on a city's basket of amenities can be derived in an analogous manner to that above. To begin, re-write the profit function in (2.2) separating total revenue and total cost as Pre-multiplying both sides of (2.6) by A j , the benefit that firms derive from amenities in city j relative to the reference city can be written as
Observe that (2.7) describes the additional input costs firms are willing to incur to locate in city j, where input costs increase with both r F and w. To complete the analogy with households, hereafter Q F is referred to as the urban "quality of business environment."
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The comparative statics of the model above with respect to the impact of amenities (A) on the equilibrium distribution of workers across cities is complicated because individual amenities can have similar or opposite appeal for households and firms. 10 Because an important goal of this paper is to evaluate the time series relationship between amenity valuations and net migration across cities, the model above is now reformulated by writing the household and firm equilibrium conditions, (2.1) and (2.2), as
where ∂u/∂Q H and ∂π/∂Q F are both positive. In both (2.8) and (2.9), a change in the amenity vector itself or a change in tastes both serve to affect the value that households and firms place on a city's amenities.
Moreover, Q H and Q F both have unambiguously positive effects on household utility and firm profits, and therefore, positive effects on a city's population of workers.
Theory: Retirees
The model above can be extended to examine the influence of amenities on retiree locations. A subtle issue arises, however, with regard to how to measure the value that retirees place on a metropolitan area's basket of amenities. Because retirees do not participate in labor markets, it is tempting to ask whether inter-city differences in land rents alone can be used to measure retiree preferences for different 9 From (2.5) and (2.7) it is clear that whereas household valuations of amenities are given by the difference between r and w, firm valuations of amenities are given by the sum of r and w. That difference arises because the iso-utility and iso-profit functions discussed above have opposite slopes.
10 See the Appendix to Blomquist et al (1988) , for example.
locations. For two reasons this is not likely to be the case. First, for the cities included in our sample, retirees are a small part of the population relative to working households. For that reason, our model is predicated on the assumption that local amenity effects are capitalized into both equilibrium wages and land rents through their influence on workers and firms in the manner portrayed in Figure 1 . Second, retirees face the same equilibrium land rents (and wages) as all other members of the population.
To understand how these features affect measurement of retiree amenity valuations, consider the following example. Suppose first that retirees were the dominant players on the demand side of the land market. In that case, land rents would always be higher in areas favored by retirees because of outward shifts in the retiree demand for land, and retiree amenity valuations would not depend on wage rates. But, when workers and firms dominate the demand side of the land market, such a monotonic correspondence between retiree amenity valuations and land rents would not prevail. For example, from Figure 1 , if a city is attractive to both households and firms then land rent will be high. But if the city is attractive to households and unattractive to firms then land rents could be low. Because the preferences of firms affect both land rents and wages, land rents only partially capture the value of local amenities, the remaining portion of which is reflected in the market wage. Measures of retiree amenity preferences based on market equilibrium land rents, therefore, must also take equilibrium wages into account as well.
In light of these arguments, and to facilitate the analysis to come, hereafter we assume that retirees place the same value on a city's basket of amenities as do workers, both of which are measured by Q H as defined in expression (2.5). Retiree indirect utility is then represented as Recall next that r j is determined by Q H and Q F as shown in Figure 1 . Substituting for r in (2.10a), the retiree's indirect utility function can also be written as ( , )
As a city becomes more attractive to industry, labor demand shifts out pushing land rent up. This hurts retirees and hence,
. Analogously, as Q H increases a city becomes more attractive to households, but this also causes labor supply to shift out pushing land rent up. As a result, the sign of
To summarize, in the model described by Figure 1 and expressions (2.1) to (2.10), workers and firms migrate in response to inter-city differences in Q H and Q F . That migration (or threat of migration), determines the equilibrium set of land rents and wages across cities while simultaneously determining the equilibrium distribution of workers and retirees across metropolitan areas. The distribution of workers is governed directly by shifts in the labor supply and demand curves for individual cities. The distribution of retirees is indirectly influenced by shifts in the labor supply and demand curves because retirees, workers, and firms all compete for space.
Empirical Measures
Estimates of the amenity valuations are constructed as follows. As in Blomquist et al (1988) and Gyourko and Tracy (1991) , wage and building rent hedonic regressions are specified as where Z ijt is a vector of worker traits for individual i in city j and year t, and X ijt is a vector of structural attributes of the building. Previous quality of life studies augment these variables with a long list of city specific amenities in order to represent a city's attributes. That approach, however, suffers from potential omitted variable bias because important amenities may be left out. 12 In addition, the standard approach presents large data requirements given that values for the time-varying amenities must be obtained for each time period. As an alternative, we include a vector of metropolitan area fixed effects, D jt . Having controlled for the quality of the worker's skill level and the building's structural attributes through Z and X, the estimated fixed effects (γ wjt and γ rjt ) reflect all location-specific attributes that affect intermetropolitan spatial variation in wages and property values at time t. , consistent with the theory above.
12 Gyourko and Tracy (1991) , for example, emphasize that Blomquist et al (1988) erred by not including local fiscal amenities in their hedonic regressions. When Gyourko and Tracy (1991) include local fiscal amenities in their model, they find that fiscal amenities are at least as valuable to households as non-fiscal amenities. That result suggests that local government can enact policies that affect Q H .
13 In (2.11) and (2.12) we assume that the coefficients on Z and X are similar across cities but vary over time.
Substituting (2.13) and (2.14) evaluated at the reference values into (2.5) and (2.7) gives the quality of life and quality of business environment, Q H,jt and Q F,jt , for each city and period.
Data
Data required for the estimation of equations (2.13) and (2.14) were obtained from the March outgoing rotation files of the Current Population Survey and the national core files of the American Housing Survey, respectively, over the 1977 to 1995 period. From those data, Z, X, and D in (2.13) and (2.14) were set equal to their sample means for 1980, the 1980 average annual wage earnings and building rents in the population. That is the same reference base as used by Blomquist et al. (1988) and Gyourko and Tracy (1991) and facilitates comparisons to their work.
While the CPS data were obtained annually for each year from 1977 to 1995, the AHS data were available on an annual basis only for the years from 1977 to 1983. After 1983, Census collected the AHS data on a biannual basis. To fill in the missing years, quality adjusted building rents for 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1994 were linearly interpolated from the adjacent years.
The wage variable employed in the study is readily obtained as the total annual wage and salary earnings for the worker. In contrast, construction of a rent variable is more complicated. Annual information on r F is not available while r H can be readily observed in the AHS. For that reason, estimates of r H and r F are both based on rents for residential properties, effectively setting r H equal to r F . In estimating U.S. GDP, the Commerce Department similarly is constrained by the absence of a quality-adjusted nonresidential real estate price series. Accordingly, our approximation here is consistent with the Commerce Department practice of using quality-adjusted residential price indexes to estimate the price deflators for both residential and non-residential real estate. Following that practice, we calculate gross rents based on householder gross rents for renter-occupied units and owners' estimates of house value for owner-occupied units. In the later case, as with Gyourko and Tracy (1991) and Blomquist et al (1988) , owners' estimates of property value are converted to annual rents using a discount rate of 7.85 percent taken from Peiser and Smith's (1985) paper on owner-occupied housing user costs.
To be included in the wage sample, an individual needed to be a full-time and full-year worker earning in excess of $1,000 per year. When estimating the rent hedonic, excluded from the housing sample were mobile homes, public housing units, rent controlled units, and other government subsidized units. In both cases, to be included in the sample an observation (individual or housing unit) had to be located in an identified MSA. The resulting sample sizes of the housing expenditure and wage samples used for the analysis vary somewhat across both the CPS and AHS data sets and the years of analysis. In 1978, for instance, the housing expenditure and wage analyses were based on samples of 23,734 and 13,981
observations, respectively.
Worker earnings were quality-adjusted using information on the worker's educational achievement, age, race, marital status, and number of dependents. Housing expenditures were qualityadjusted in a similarly standard manner using information from the AHS on the housing unit characteristics Gyourko and Tracy (1991) suggest that there is a relatively high degree of correlation in findings. In both studies, older, industrialized 16 In the 1970s, the CPS identified only the 39 largest cities in the United States. In two of those cities it is not possible to obtain measures of population within a fixed set of geographic boundaries over time. This reduced our set of cities to the 37 noted above.
17 Standard errors for the Q H and Q F values in Table 1a were calculated based on the estimated covariances for the hedonic coefficient from the different years over which the hedonic models were estimated. In addition, the average values for Q H and Q F in Table 1a reflect values taken from every other year of the Q H and Q F measures beginning with 1977. This was done because the CPS sample turns over every two years. In addition, most renters move within two years of arriving in their home, although most homeowners do not. As an approximation, therefore, biannual data largely removes spurious correlation when averaging Q H and Q F over time. That permits us to set the covariance terms to zero when calculating the variance and standard errors for the average values of Q H and Q F reported in Table 1a .
midwestern and eastern cities such as Detroit, Kansas City, Baltimore, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Gary, and Akron, were ranked among the lowest quality-of-life metropolitan areas. In addition, in both studies warm coastal cities like Miami, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, and Los Angeles-Anaheim score among the areas with the highest quality of life. Thus, it appears that our 1977-95 average Q H measures are relatively similar to those of Gyourko and Tracy (1991) , despite the use of different data and a different estimation method.
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A striking result now emerges when one compares household and firm valuations of different cities. Observe that many of the cities least attractive to households are large industrial metropolitan areas, such as Detroit, Gary, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C, all of which are ranked in the bottom quartile by households. How could these cities be among the largest metropolitan areas in the United States if households don't want to live there? The answer of course, is that firms value the amenities in these areas: all of these cities are ranked in the upper half by firms. Detroit, for example, was ranked 37 by households but was ranked 9 by firms. Washington D.C was ranked 25 by households but 4 by firms. Two important messages emerge from this comparison. First, for a city to grow large, either households must want to live in the city as in Miami -pushing labor supply out -or firms must want to do business in the city as in Washington D.C. -pushing labor demand out -or both as in New York, San Francisco, and Los
Angeles. Second, firms and households often do not like the same cities, a result that reflects the very different objectives of the two groups -utility maximization versus profit maximization. 18 The comparisons above are based on the second model presented in Gyourko and Tracy (1991) : "Random Effects, Group Effects Included" in Table 3 of their paper. That model is the closest to the fixed effects approach used here. In addition, the median standard error of Q H and Q F across cities and years in our sample was roughly $1,200 (because Q H and Q F are estimated as linear combinations of r j and w j , the standard errors on Q F are identical to those for Q H ). That estimate is also close to standard errors for the most comparable model presented in Gyourko and Tracy (1991) . In contrast, the median standard error for the 1977-95 biannual average for Q H and Q F in Table 1a is considerably smaller, $342. The greatly reduced standard errors in Table 1a reflect the greater quantity of data used to calculate the biannual average values relative to those for individual cities and years. Do these patterns persist over time? To address that question, in 
Empirical Model: Changes in Amenity Valuations and Migration in a System of Cities
The error correction model
The principal framework used to analyze the system of cities model described in Section 2 is an error correction model (ECM). This model takes advantage of the year-to-year variation in the data and is comprised of two parts. The first part, typically referred to as the cointegrating equation, describes the long run relationship between the variables of interest, in this case, city population shares, Q H , and Q F as outlined in Section 2. The second part, referred to as the error correction equation, is a vector autoregression (VAR) in which the variables of interest are constrained to return to their long-run relationship following a shock to the system. This equation permits us to estimate the speed of such convergence. The development of these equations proceeds as follows.
Consider first plots of worker log-population shares in Figure 4 for the individual cities in the sample. Observe that most of the cities display rather pronounced trends. A similar pattern holds for retiree log-population shares in Figure 5 . These plots suggest that it is desirable to control for trends when evaluating changes in population shares over time.
Next, augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests were estimated to check for unit roots in each of the principle series to be studied. In Table 2 observe that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that worker and retiree log-population shares, Q H , and Q F are I(1), and hence, are non-stationary and non-mean reverting series. 19 That result is important because if log-population shares were of a different order of integrationthe degree of differencing necessary to render the series stationary -then Q H and Q F could not explain intertemporal flows of population across cities. 20 Finding that each of the principal series are of the same order of integration, therefore, is a necessary condition if Q H and Q F are to determine the spatial distribution of population across cities. 21 In light of these arguments and results, we treat all of the principal series as I(1). As will become apparent, this also has implications for the specification of the ECM.
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We turn now to the cointegrating equation that governs the long-run relationship between worker log-population shares (P worker ), Q H , and Q F , variables that are expected to move together over time to equilibrate the system of cities. As will become apparent, analogous regressions are also run for retiree log-19 Each ADF test was conducted with a constant to control for drift and a time trend. Two lags of the dependent variable were also included to control for serial correlation. Diagnostic tests of the residuals from the unit root regressions indicate that these controls were sufficient to whiten the residuals, a necessary condition for valid interpretation of the ADF test statistics. Jarque-Bera tests of the residuals from the ADF regressions could not reject the null of a normal distribution in all but a couple of cases, while Q-statistics indicated flat correlograms in nearly all instances. In addition, the trend term was often highly significant, and omitting the trend term often caused the residuals to have a pronounced trend, especially in the population share regressions. 20 Regressing an I(1) series on an I(0) series, for example, always yields a zero coefficient with a sufficiently long time series. The reason is that the I(1) series follows a random walk and is not mean reverting, while the I(0) series is stationary and always reverts back to its long-run mean given a sufficiently long time series. 21 In addition, evidence that log(P worker ) is I (1) is exactly what one would anticipate in a system of cities where larger cities gain a comparative advantage over competing metropolitan areas because of enhanced urbanization economies, and therefore, grow larger still. Helsley and Strange (1994) , for example, argue that even if cities have similar initial endowments, those cities that develop first -encounter positive initial shocks to their population shares -ultimately become the largest cities in the system because of the agglomeration economies that stem from the early manufactured infrastructure. 22 As a robustness check, in Table A -1 of the Appendix we also present ADF tests on the log-population shares for six cities based on decade-by-decade data going back to 1800. Although the longer time horizon increases the power of the ADF tests, we still fail to reject the null of a unit root in five of the six cities. population shares by substituting P retiree for P worker . After some experimentation, our preferred specification of the cointegrating relation is given by the following equation, for all cities j = {1, …, J}. The coefficients of interest are c 1 and c 2 . Evidence that these coefficients are both positive would imply that amenity-induced outward shifts in the labor supply and demand curves serve to increase the equilibrium size of a city's workforce, a central prediction of the model in Section 2
and Figure 1 . Alternatively, when P retiree is substituted for P worker we expect c 2 to be negative while the sign of c 1 is indeterminate for reasons outlined earlier.
To ensure that (5.1) yields consistent estimates of 1 c and 2 c , a city-specific constant is included in (5.1) to control for time-invariant city effects, while a time trend is included given evidence of trending as noted above. 23 In addition, because the principal series are all assumed to be I(1), OLS estimates of the coefficients on Q H and Q F would ordinarily have non-standard limiting distributions making inference difficult [e.g. Engle and Granger (1987) ]. To address that problem, (5.1) includes leads and lags of the first-differences of the coefficients on Q H and Q F . As shown by Saikkonen (1991) variables are allowed to vary across cities to allow for differences across urban areas as before.
A key variable in (5.2) is the 1-period lag of the error term from (5.1), e j,t-1.
26 Given that (5.1) describes the long run relationship between P worker , Q H and Q F , the lagged error term can be interpreted as a short run deviation of the system cities from its long-run equilibrium path. Provided e j,t-1 has a non-zero coefficient in (5.2), its inclusion in the model constrains ∆log(P jt ), the dependent variable in (5.2), to return to its long run path. Moreover, the coefficient on e j,t-1 , denoted by g, measures the speed of convergence back to long run equilibrium. Because each city j = {1, …, J} is part of the system, in general no city can 25 As discussed by Engle and Granger (1987) , log-population shares, Q H , and Q F are cointegrated if there exists at least one linear combination of the variables that yields a stationary outcome. That property can be tested by applying ADF tests to the residuals from (5.1). Results of those tests are presented in Table A -2 of the Appendix. In 27 of the 37 cities we reject the null of a unit root in favor of stationarity. Similar tests produce comparable results for alternative specifications of (5.1) to follow. These results support the presence of a stable long-run relationship between the variables of interest for most but not all cities.
26 Including e j,t-1 in (5.2) presumes that population shares and city valuations are cointegrated. Otherwise, one could omit e j,t-1 and estimate (5.2) based on an unrestricted VAR. As will become apparent in Table 3 , however, the coefficient on e j,t-1 is highly significant which argues for inclusion of e j,t-1 in the model. In addition, as noted previously, ADF tests presented in Table A -2 of the Appendix reject the null that e j,t-1 follows a unit root for most cities, consistent with the assumption that population shares and city valuations are cointegrated.
be in long run equilibrium unless the entire system is in equilibrium. For that reason, when estimating (5.2) g is constrained to be alike for all cities. Table 3 provides the core results for the ECM. 28 In column 1, worker log-population shares are regressed on Q H and Q F based on the specification in (5.1). Observe that both Q H and Q F have strong positive and highly significant effects on a metropolitan area's share of the workforce. This supports the theory underlying Figure 1 : as a city becomes relatively more attractive to workers and firms, labor supply and demand both shift out and the relative size of the city in the overall system of cities increases.
Results from the ECM for Workers and Retirees
In column 2 retiree log-population share is substituted for worker log-population share. The specification of the model is otherwise the same as before. In sharp contrast to column 1, Q H and Q F have negative and significant effects on retiree population shares, consistent with the theory underlying equation These latter results are reinforced by the last two columns of the table where the log ratio of retiree to worker population shares is used as the dependent variable. That ratio is equivalent to 27 Together, two-stage estimates of equations (5.1) and (5.2) comprise a modified Engle-Granger (1987) method for estimating a vector error correction model. An alternative to the Engle-Granger method is the Johansen method (Johansen (1991) ) which is a full information Maximum-Likelihood procedure capable of estimating both the ECM and the number of cointegrating vectors. However, the Johansen method suffers from substantial small sample bias and lack of robustness to specification error. Although the Engle-Granger method requires that one impose a priori the number of cointegrating vectors (of which there could be either one or two in our case), the Engle-Granger method is more robust in the presence of short time series such as ours.
the ratio of retirees to workers in city j less a constant k, where k equals the log-ratio of retirees to workers for the entire system of cities (denoted by log( / )
therefore, have a high ratio of retirees to workers relative to the overall system.
In column 5 observe that Q H and Q F have strong negative and highly significant effects on the ratio of retirees to workers in a metropolitan area. In column 6, as before, an increase in the cost of living (r) has a negative and significant impact on the relative presence of retirees in a city as compared to workers. In addition, an increase in Q H has a positive and significant influence on a city's retiree-to-worker ratio. These findings lend further support to the argument that retirees tend to seek out attractive low-cost locations, consistent with theoretical arguments by Graves and Knapp (1988) . More generally, the pattern of results suggests that retirees tend to move away from cities that become increasingly attractive to workers and firms in order to avoid the higher land rents that result from increased competition for space. Table 3 also presents estimates of the coefficient on the error correction term in the second stage equation as described in equation (5.2). For the worker population models and the retiree/worker population models, the coefficients are roughly .2. This says that following a shock to the system of cities that creates migratory pressures -as with an influx of immigrants to a given city or with the enactment of new pro-business policies, for example -the distribution of population in the system moves roughly 20 percent of the way back to long run equilibrium after 1 year. This translates into an adjustment period of roughly 8-1/2 years for 90 percent return to equilibirum. In contrast, the error correction coefficient for the retiree models in columns 2 and 3 is roughly .3. This implies a period of roughly 6 years for 90 percent adjustment back to equilibrium. The clear message here is that retiree population shares respond to unexpected shocks to the system of cities roughly one-third faster than the population of workers. Given that migration of workers requires a coordinated movement of industry-specific human and physical capital, the slower adjustment period for workers is quite plausible.
Conclusion
Are the cities in which families want to live similar to the cities in which firms wants to operate?
To what extent do changes in the value of local amenities affect the relative size and composition of individual cities, especially with regard to the presence of workers and retirees? This paper addresses these and related questions while also making three important methodological contributions to the literature on urban quality of life.
Our analysis is based on the argument that urban amenities are vitally important to the locational choices of both households and firms. However, while existing literature has measured household valuations of urban areas -referred to as quality of life in the literature -systematic assessment of the firm valuations of urban areas -referred to as quality of the business environment in this paper -has been absent from the academic literature. Accordingly, our most important methodological contribution is to construct and estimate a measure of firm valuations of city-specific amenities in a manner that is solidly grounded in economic theory.
A second important innovation concerns dynamics. Prior to this paper, the quality of life literature has been largely static in nature, precluding analysis of changes in city valuations over time and related effects on the growth and composition of individual metropolitan areas. In this paper, we construct a panel of household and firm valuations of urban amenities for 37 metropolitan areas in the United States from 1977 to 1995. That panel is developed using panel data methods that greatly simplify construction of amenity valuations relative to prior studies. This allows us to examine the dynamics of worker and retiree migration across cities in response to changes over time in the quality of life and the quality of the business environment.
Our third important innovation concerns tests of the model. Prior studies have emphasized that individual amenities could have opposite or similar appeal to workers and firms, and therefore, ambiguous effects on the equilibrium distribution of population across cities. That emphasis has largely precluded testing of the model. In contrast, by focusing on the relationship between population shares across cities, quality of the business environment, and quality of life, we are able to test several of the most fundamental predictions of the model.
A striking result is that many of the cities least attractive to households are attractive to firms.
Detroit, Gary, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C, for example, are all ranked in the bottom quartile in the eyes of households but are all ranked in the upper half by firms. Those differences reflect the very different goals of the two groups -utility maximization versus profit maximization.
In addition, estimates from an error correction model (ECM) indicate that improvements in quality of life and quality of the business environment have strong positive effects on urban growth as measured by equilibrium city shares of workers, but negative effects on equilibrium city shares of retirees. The former result supports a central feature of the model, that worker population shares increase in response to amenity-induced outward shifts of the labor supply and demand curves. The latter result suggests that retirees avoid high land rents that result from in-movement of firms and workers. That finding is consistent with theoretical work by Graves and Knapp (1988) who argue that retirees should seek out cities in which amenities are capitalized into lower wages as opposed to higher land rents.
Additional results from the ECM indicate that following a shock that creates migratory pressures in the system of cities, worker-population shares converge 90 percent of the way back to long run equilibrium in 8-1/2 years while retiree-population shares achieve 90 percent convergence in 6 years. The longer response time of the worker population likely reflects the cost of moving industry-specific human and physical capital, a cost that impedes worker mobility relative to that of retirees.
Finally, from a policy perspective, results from this paper suggest an intriguing possibility.
Economic development initiatives designed to attract workers and firms -such as tax breaks offered to industry -may have the unintended effect of repelling retirees. The degree to which this may or may not occur requires further research. Nevertheless, it is clear that local government policies designed to attract industry and retirees should ideally be coordinated so that one set of policy initiatives does not inadvertently negate the other. A lbany A kron The estimated coefficients on Q H , Q F , and r in the cointegrating equations were constrained to be alike across cities. The coefficients on all of the other variables included in (5.1) and (5.2) were allowed to vary across cities. Those coefficients total 444 parameters over the two equations and 37 cities and are not presented to conserve space. b A modified form of the Engle-Granger two-step method (Engle and Granger (1987) ) was used to estimate the ECM to ensure that the standard errors and related t-ratios in the cointegrating equations have standard limiting distributions. Specifically, the cointegrating equations were estimated by ordinary least squares including 1 lead and 1 lag of the first differences of the two right-hand side variables of interest -either Q H and Q F or Q H and r depending on the specification of the model (see Saikkonen (1991) ).
c The dependent variables in the cointegrating equations are in log-levels. The dependent variables in the error correction equations are in log-first differences (annual growth rates of population shares). Retiree log-population share less worker log-population share equals k N R j j − ) / log( , the ratio of retirees to workers in city j less a constant k, where k equals the log-ratio of retirees to workers for the entire system of cities. 
